Technology Adoption and Dissemination in Agriculture: Evidence from Sequential Intervention in Maize Production in Uganda by MATSUMOTO Tomoya et al.
  
 
 
GRIPS Discussion Paper 13-14 
 
 
 
 
 
Technology Adoption and Dissemination in Agriculture: 
Evidence from Sequential Intervention in Maize Production in Uganda 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tomoya Matsumoto 
Takashi Yamano 
Dick Sserunkuuma 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
July 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies 
7-22-1 Roppongi, Minato-ku, 
Tokyo, Japan 106-8677 
 1 
 
Technology Adoption and Dissemination in Agriculture: 
Evidence from Sequential Intervention in Maize Production in 
Uganda 
By TOMOYA MATSUMOTO, TAKASHI YAMANO, AND DICK SSERUNKUUMA* 
We use a randomized control trial to measure how the free 
distribution of modern inputs for maize production affects their 
adoption in the subsequent season. Information collected through 
sales meetings where modern inputs were sold revealed that the 
average purchase quantity of free-input recipients was much higher 
than that of non-recipients; that of the neighbors of recipients fell 
in-between. Also, credit sales had a large impact on purchase 
quantity, and the yield performance of plots where the free inputs 
had been applied positively affected the purchase quantities of both 
recipients and the neighbors with whom they shared information on 
farming. (JEL O13, O33, O55) 
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Why are the adoption rates of modern agricultural inputs such as hybrid seed 
and chemical fertilizers so low in developing countries? This is an empirical 
puzzle that relates to technology adoption in agriculture. In Sub-Sahara Africa in 
particular, the adoption rate and application level of agricultural modern inputs 
have been very low. Despite the presence of large-scale public interventions that 
encourage farmers to use such technologies and boost agricultural productivity, 
their proliferation has been slow and incomplete; hence, agricultural productivity 
in this region has been stagnant for several decades.
1
  
This study examines technology adoption and dissemination in terms of maize 
production in Uganda, where the dissemination of technologies relating to 
intensive farming methods is in its nascent stage. Technologies for maize 
production, more concretely, modern inputs such as chemical fertilizers and 
hybrid seeds have been rarely used in Uganda by small-scale farmers. However, 
 
1
 Morris, Kelly, Kopicki, and Byerlee (2007) provide a comprehensive review of public interventions geared toward the 
promotion of fertilizer use in Sub-Sahara Africa, as well as the consequences thereof. 
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observing recent drastic changes in market and production environment, for 
instance, land scarcity due to population pressure, hike in crop prices, 
improvement of access to commodity markets and market information; it seems 
that Ugandan farmers are facing the onset of transition from traditional to modern 
farming system. 
A situation in which there is potential demand for inputs but those inputs are 
not well-known to farmers is ideal for us in examining farmers’ adoption behavior 
of new agricultural technologies and their diffusion. To investigate the impact of a 
proposed policy intervention on technology adoption among small-scale farmers, 
in 2009, we conducted an experimental intervention in maize production in 
Uganda. The intervention involved a sequential randomized–controlled trial. The 
first exercise therein was a village-level randomized control trial, implemented 
prior to the first cropping season. We distributed free maize inputs and gave 2 
hours of instruction on the use of those inputs. We targeted households located in 
46 treatment villages, randomly selected from 69 target villages; we asked each 
household to allocate a quarter-acre of land as a trial plot where the inputs would 
be applied, while we did not do so in the other 23 control villages. The second 
exercise of the trial occurred in the intermediate period between the first and 
subsequent cropping seasons of 2009, when we revisited the 69 target villages to 
sell the same inputs previously provided for free to the sample farmers. We held a 
sales meeting in each of the target villages, inviting both the original target 
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households and the neighbors of the free-input recipients in the treatment villages. 
The purpose of the workshop was to gather information on input demand for the 
participating households and make comparisons among the three groups—the 
non-recipients, recipients, and neighbors of the recipients—by actually selling the 
modern inputs. In addition to the experimental interventions (i.e., the free-input 
distribution and the sales meeting), we conducted the survey in October–
December 2009 to collect information, particularly on the performance of the trial 
plots and details of social networking among the participants in the interventions. 
Data from both the experimental interventions and the later survey were used in 
this study. 
The information from the sales meeting showed that (i) the distribution of 
modern agricultural inputs has a positive effect on the purchases of farmers with 
little experience in the use of inputs; (ii) the intervention had a spillover effect on 
the neighbors’ adoption; and (iii) the credit sale option also had a large impact, as 
it allowed deferred payment of the input cost after the harvest. The impact of the 
credit sales was largest among recipients of the free trial packages.  
Moreover, the survey data revealed that there was a high level of heterogeneity 
across the recipients, in terms of yield performance of the trial plots where the 
distributed inputs were applied. There were some individuals for whom the yield 
gain from the use of modern inputs was not sufficiently large to cover the cost of 
inputs, although the inputs did help many farmers realize a positive profit. The 
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heterogeneity in the return of inputs in the trial plots enabled us to examine the 
intensity of own learning as well as social learning related to the performance of 
the modern inputs.  
Among the recipients, the yield gain from the modern inputs, measured by the 
difference between the actual yield of the trial plot and the hypothetical yield of 
traditional farming methods predicted by the farmers themselves, positively 
affected their purchase quantities. Not surprisingly, a successful experience 
tended to increase the farmers’ purchase quantities of modern inputs for the 
subsequent season more than an unsuccessful one. 
The performance of the trial plots of the recipients of the free inputs also 
positively affected the purchase quantities of the neighbors with whom the 
recipients shared information on the farming business; on the other hand, it did 
not affect the purchase quantities of neighbor households who merely lived in 
proximity but did not exchange farming information with the recipients. These 
findings suggest that farmers learn new agricultural technologies through social 
networking rather than through geographic peers, and that they will adopt such 
technologies in cases where they recognize the benefits thereof. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section I reviews the related 
literature and background information on the current farming system in Uganda. 
Section II discusses a series of interventions that we have conducted in Uganda 
since January 2009. Section III discusses the village-level and household-level 
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data comprising the same, by type of household. Section IV reports the key results 
of the sales experiment and yield predictions based on the quantities of modern 
agricultural inputs purchased at the sales experiment. Finally, Section V 
concludes the paper. 
I. Background 
 
A. Related literature 
There has been a growing body of empirical literature on technology adoption 
in agriculture in Africa.
2
 There is little doubt that there are profitable agricultural 
technologies suitable to conditions in Africa. Many studies confirm the high 
average return of agricultural inputs or methods, for example, fertilizers for maize 
production in Kenya (Duflo, Kremer, and Robinson (2008)) and hybid seeds in 
Kenya (  ri (    )), fertili ers for cocoa prod ction in  hana ( eitlin,  aria, 
  ene,  ans  ,  po  , and  eal (    )), and the s stem of rice intensification 
(SRI) method for rice production in Madagascar (Moser and Barret (2006)). 
Nonetheless, such technologies tend to diffuse slowly and incompletely. This 
 
2
 The literature on technology adoption in agriculture is reviewed comprehensively by Sunding and Zilberman (2001) 
and Feder, Just, and Zilberman (1985). Foster and Rosenzweig (2010) review more recent literature in technology adoption 
in general, and Munshi (2008) reviews literature on social learning. 
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observation constitutes a puzzle in Africa, if one considers the low rate of 
adoption of technologies that offer the promise of high returns. 
In the case of Uganda, evidence of the profitability of modern agricultural 
inputs is sporadic, and some of the available estimates are conflicting. The results 
of trial plots for experimental purposes indicate the very high physical returns of 
modern inputs. For instance, based on a report by the National Agricultural 
Research Organization (NARO) in Uganda, the difference in average crop yields 
between NARO trial stations that use modern inputs and the plots of local farmers 
who typically use no modern inputs shows a considerable physical yield response 
to the inputs, indicating large potential profits (Bayite-Kasule (2009)). Namazzi 
(2008) reports the results of fertilizer response trials on maize that were carried 
out in 2003 across different districts by Sasakawa Global 2000, an international 
nongovernmental organization that promotes agricultural technologies in several 
African countries; that study shows that fertilizer application was generally high 
and profitable, although the level of profitability varied by region.  
Unlike the reports from the trial plots, the results of local farmer surveys tend to 
be quite varied. Matsumoto and Yamano (2009) estimate the maize yield function, 
using plot-level panel data from 2003 and 2005; they compare the marginal 
physical product of inorganic fertilizer with its relative price to maize grain, and 
conclude that the relative price is too high for the average farmer to turn a profit 
from the use of fertilizer. Nkonya, Pender, Kaizzi, Kato, and Mugarura (2005) 
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also report that the use of inorganic fertilizer appears not to be profitable for most 
farmers, based on the results of their farm household survey. 
 he inp ts’ low average economic ret rn on the gro nd does not necessaril  
mean that such technologies are not profitable to all farmers who face different 
weather, soil, and market-access conditions, given the high performance of 
modern inputs in demonstration plots. Returns could vary among regions and 
even individuals, depending not only on their environment and conditions but also 
on their knowledge of how to use the technologies. Several recent studies point 
out the importance of heterogeneous returns to agricultural technologies, to 
understand the reasons of low adoption rate of technologies that have high 
average expected returns. Suri (2011) argues, in her study of maize production 
that covers most of the maize-growing areas in Kenya, that the low adoption rate 
of modern inputs can be accounted for by the heterogeneity of returns to modern 
inputs.
3
 That is, although the average ret rn is high, the ret rn differs largel  
across regions, individ als, and time, and hence, some farmers do not  se them 
persistentl    eitlin,  aria,   ene,  ans  ,  po  , and  eal (    ) also report 
that the high average effect of modern inputs on cocoa production among Ghanian 
farmers were found to be consistent with negative economic profits, for a 
 
3
 Duflo, Kremer, and Robinson (2008) also found that the returns of inorganic fertilizer in maize production varied 
across farmers in western Kenya. 
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substantial fraction of the farmers who were provided a package of fertilizer and 
other inputs on credit. 
In our experimental setting, the modern inputs distributed to farmers for the 
purpose of their trial were not tailored, and instruction on usage delivered to 
farmers in the training workshop was uniform across all villages and participants. 
Given heterogeneous agricultural and market conditions, we expected that the 
non-tailored inputs would create variations in return across villages and even 
individuals within a village. Thus, in addition to the average effect of an 
intervention that involves the introduction of new inputs, we also focus in the 
following section on measuring the effect of heterogeneous returns on adoption 
and assess whether differences in returns are related to the adoption of the inputs 
in the subsequent season.  
Our study also looks to measure the effect of social learning. Recent literature 
on technology adoption often uses experiments to measure social-learning effects 
(Kremer and Miguel (2007), Duflo, Kremer, and Robinson (2011), Dupas (2010)). 
Experimental approaches can overcome the reflection problem that arises when 
inferring that the adoption behavior of individuals is due to other reference group 
members’ adoption—behavior that could be due, in turn, to the presence of 
common unobservable characteristics that also affect all member adoption 
(Manski (1993)). Using an experimental approach, researchers can create an 
exogenous variation in distribution that determines whether or not experiment 
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participants are exposed to a new technology in the initial period, whereupon the 
researchers can then observe their neighbors’ adoption in subsequent periods. Our 
study is within this domain.  
The social-learning effect was measured by comparing the purchase quantities 
of the modern inputs between the neighbors of the recipients of free inputs and 
those who lived in the control villages. We found large positive effects, which is 
not consistent with the findings of Duflo, Kremer, and Robinson (2011) or Suri 
(2011), each of who found little evidence of social learning in modern inputs for 
maize production among Kenyan farmers. An important difference between these 
studies and ours is that the technologies addressed (i.e., hybrid seed and chemical 
fertilizers) are not new to Kenyan farmers, but are new to Ugandan farmers. In 
Kenya, these technologies have been known to most farmers for many years (Suri 
(2011)); in our sample in Uganda, however, only 10 percent of households had 
reported experience in the use of hybrid seed before our intervention, and a 
negligible number of households had used chemical fertilizers in crop production. 
Unlike Uganda, there might be nothing new or easy to learn from others at this 
stage of the diffusion process in Kenya. Thus, once we consider the difference in 
the degree of dissemination between these two countries, the difference in impact 
as a result of social learning, with respect to these technologies, will be more 
readily comprehended. 
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In addition to the experiment, during the first intervention, we collected detailed 
information regarding social networks from the neighbors of the recipients of the 
free inputs. Using this information, we disting ished learning from “geographic 
peers” who live in geographical proximit  from that of “information peers” who 
exchange farming business information. We found that the performance of the 
trial plots of the recipients also positively affected the purchase quantities of the 
information peers, but that it did not affect the purchase quantities of the 
geographic peers. This finding is consistent with that of a recent study by Conley 
and Udry (2010), who argue that it is not geographical proximity but rather 
information networks that significantly enhance social learning. 
B. Maize production in Uganda 
In Africa, the application level of chemical fertilizers and the adoption rate of 
high-yielding varieties are generally much lower than in other parts of the world. 
However, there are also large variations across African countries. One example 
can be seen in the interesting contrast in the use of modern inputs for maize 
production between two neighboring countries, Kenya and Uganda (Matsumoto 
and Yamano (2009)). Only a few farmers in Uganda have used modern inputs in 
maize production while most farmers in Kenya have used them for long. 
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Table 1 compares input use for maize production between Kenya and Uganda, 
using data from the RePEAT surveys in Kenya and Uganda.
4
 In the survey years, 
only 5 percent of farmers in Uganda planted hybrid maize seed, and they applied 
negligible amounts of chemical and organic fertilizers on the maize plots. In 
contrast, about 60 percent of Kenyan farmers planted hybrid seed and used 94 
kg/ha of chemical fertilizers; in addition, they used more than 1 ton/ha of organic 
fertilizers on maize plots. Some of the farmers in Kenya have been using such 
inputs for a decade or longer, and most of them have at least some experience 
with them.
5
 As a consequence, the average maize yield is higher in Kenya than in 
Uganda. 
[ Insert Table 1 Here ] 
Owing to the high transportation costs associated with the import of modern 
inputs, particularly in Uganda, the market price of those inputs is high, and hence 
their profitability is low (Omamo (2003)). As standard neoclassical models of 
 
4
 RePEAT (Research on Poverty, Environment, and Agricultural Technologies) is a research project headed by a 
research team of the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) and the Foundation for Advanced Studies on 
International Development (FASID, Japan). It aims to identify constraints and effective technologies that reduce poverty in 
east African countries—especially Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia—through empirical analyses based on field data vis-à-vis 
agricultural production, collected from farm households. RePEAT also indicates their intention to repeat data collection, in 
order to construct panel data over a longer period. (See Yamano, et al. (2004) for more details.) 
5
 The RePEAT surveys in Kenya mainly covered areas in the Central, Rift Valley, Nyaza, and Western provinces, 
where population density is higher and the environment is better suited to crop production than other areas. 
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technology adoption predict,
6
 the low profitability of modern inputs has been one 
of the major reasons for low adoption rates and application levels among Ugandan 
farmers. In addition, in the past, the issue of land scarcity was not a prominent one 
in Uganda, owing to favorable climate conditions for crop production relative to 
the population densities of the country. Thus, Ugandan farmers have had little 
incentive to use modern inputs for intensive farming. Moreover, because of the 
low potential demand for these inputs, the supply network in Uganda has not been 
adequately developed to make their use financially feasible. 
However, conditions for farming have been changing drastically in Uganda. 
First, because of high population pressures
7
 and limitations for the expansion of 
arable land through land-clearing, land is becoming increasingly scarce; as a 
result, the average amount of land per household has been decreasing rapidly 
(National Environment Management Authority (2007)). Second, recent hikes in 
crop prices are prompting farmers to change their perceptions with regard to crop 
production. Some farmers have started to consider crop production a business 
enterprise rather than purely for subsistence. Third, owing to infrastructure 
 
6
 See, for instance, Besley and Case (1993) and Munshi (2004) with regard to the model for learning about the 
profitability of new technologies, and Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) and Conley and Udry (2010) with regard to the model 
for learning about the management of new technologies. 
7
 Estimates of annual population growth rate in 2005 placed Uganda in 11th place worldwide (3.58%) and Kenya in 
42nd place (2.36%). 
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improvements such as roads and mobile networks, farmers have had better access 
to commodity markets and market information than before.
8
 These factors have 
created high potential demand for intensive farming methods among crop farmers 
in Uganda. Since these modern inputs are experience goods, a lack of knowledge 
on their usage and profitability might be a large deterrent to their adoption by 
farmers who have little experience. Thus, we expected that small interventions 
involving one-time material support and training on the usage of such modern 
agricultural inputs would have a large impact on their adoption among Ugandan 
farmers in the long term. 
II. Experimental Design and Survey Data 
To investigate the impact of a possible policy intervention on technology 
adoption by small-scale Ugandan farmers, we conducted an experimental 
intervention there in maize production, in 2009.
9
 The intervention was a 
 
8
 M to and Yamano (   9) show that the expansion of mobile networ s has ind ced farmers’ mar et participation in 
Uganda. 
9
 The experimental intervention was carried out as part of the Global Center of Excellence (GCOE) Project of GRIPS, 
Japan, in collaboration with Makerere University, Uganda. It was financially supported by Ministry of Education, Culture, 
Sports, Science, and Technology, Japan. 
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sequential randomized–controlled trial.10  The target sites and individuals were 
the sample villages and households in the Eastern and Central regions surveyed 
for the RePEAT panel study.
11
 
[ Insert Figure 1 Here ] 
A. Free-input distribution 
In the first exercise, which took place in February and March 2009, prior to the 
first cropping season, we distributed free maize inputs to 377 RePEAT 
households and asked them to allocate a quarter-acre of land (approximately 0.1 
ha) as a trial plot where the inputs would be applied. These households are located 
within 46 villages (26 and 20 in the Eastern and Central regions, respectively) that 
were randomly chosen from the RePEAT villages.
12
 For convenience, we refer to 
 
10
 Figure 1 shows the timeline for and the number of sample households involved in each project within the RePEAT 
study. In the initial RePEAT household survey in 2003, 10 households were surveyed in each village. Because of attrition, 
106 households dropped out from the 61 treatment villages. 
11
 Three of the 94 RePEAT survey villages are excluded from this experimental intervention. Two of them are located 
in Kapchowa district, close to the Kenyan border. Their application rates of chemical fertilizers and their adoption rates of 
hybrid maize seed, according to the 2005 RePEAT survey, were exceptionally high. The other village has been involved in 
the United Nations’ Millenni m Village Project since    8   hese villages are ver  different from others in terms of their 
experience with modern inputs, and they were thus excluded as unrepresentative outliers. 
12
  he smallest local administrative  nit in Uganda is L    In this paper, we refer to the L   as a “village ” We 
included in the free-input distribution 22 villages (15 treatment and seven control villages) in the Western region. However, 
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the ho seholds in the 46 villages as the “treatment ho seholds” 13 ; this 
distinguishes them from the remaining households located in the other 23 villages 
(13 and 10 in the Eastern and Central regions, respectively) that are referred to as 
the “control ho seholds ”14 The geographic distribution of those villages is shown 
in Figure 2. The randomization for the selection of the treatment villages was 
implemented based on a computer-generated random number after the 
stratification by region. 
 [ Insert Figure 2 Here ] 
 
The free inputs distributed to the treatment households were uniform (i.e., non-
tailored) across the treatment villages. They comprised 2.5 kg of hybrid seed, 12.5 
kg of base fertilizer, and 10 kg of top-dressing fertilizer.
15
 In addition, a 2-hour 
                                                                                                                                     
they were excluded from the second exercise because of time and budget constraints. Thus, in this study, we focus on 
samples only from the Eastern and Central regions. 
13
 There were a small number of households who were part of the original RePEAT sample and invited to the 
workshop where free inputs were distributed but did not attend and hence did not obtain them. We also call these 
ho seholds “treatment ho seholds ”  h s, the treatment ho seholds can be considered part of an “intent to treat” sample  
14
 We included in the free-input distribution 22 villages (15 treatment and seven control villages) in the Western region. 
However, they were excluded from the second exercise because of time and budget constraints. Thus, in this study, we 
focus on samples only from the Eastern and Central regions. 
15
 These are the recommended input levels for growing a quarter-acre of maize by an agronomist in National 
Agricultural Research Organization, Namulonge, Uganda just for a research purpose for us to implement an uniform 
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training session on the use of these modern inputs was delivered by an extension 
worker to the members of the treatment households. 
B. Sales experiment 
The second exercise occurred in August and September 2009—the intermediate 
period between the first and subsequent cropping seasons—during which we 
revisited 46 treatment and 23 control villages in the Eastern and Central regions to 
sell the same inputs that had previously been provided for free to the sample 
farmers. We held a sales meeting in each of the target villages and invited 
members of all the RePEAT households, as well as randomly selected neighbors 
of the treatment ho seholds (called “neighbor ho seholds,” hereafter)   o select 
the neighbor households, we visited each of the treatment households prior to the 
sales experiment, asked the household head to list five to 10 households as 
neighbors, and then randomly selected one household from the list as the 
“neighbor ho sehold ” We expected this neighbor-household selection procedure 
to mitigate the selection bias that would occur if the treatment households were to 
invite households with special interests or relationships (e.g., friends or relatives), 
                                                                                                                                     
intervention. The composition may not be optimal under some circumstances because it does not consider heterogeneity of 
agroclimatic environments as well as input-output price ratio. The market value of these inputs was 52,500 Ugandan 
Shillings (Ush) (US$26.80, at the exchange rate of February 2009). 
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especially, in cases where the treatment households perceived our first 
intervention to be beneficial.  
We held the sales meeting and provided the supplies procured from a whole 
seller in Kampala by ourselves, rather than working with local input suppliers. 
This was because the supply network of agricultural inputs had not been well 
developed and hence there were places in our target areas where we could not 
procure the reliable quality inputs from local retailers.  
The purpose of the sales experiment was to gather information on input demand 
for the participating households and to make comparisons among the three 
groups—the control, treatment, and neighbor households. To obtain information 
on their demand in response to a change in price, we  sed a “price contingent 
order form” that as ed farmers how m ch of each inp t the  wo ld b   at 
different discount levels (Appendix). Three discount rates from the market price 
were offered, namely, 0, 10, and 20 percent.
16
 Which discount rate would be used 
for the actual sales was not determined until they filled out the order form, 
although the participants were informed at the beginning of the sales experiment 
that one of the discount rates would be randomly chosen and that they would need 
to pay for the amounts indicated on the form at the chosen discounted price.  
 
16
 We were interested in collecting information on the purchase quantities at a wider range of discount rates. However, 
given the possibility that the participants could profit from reselling inputs to other residents or even input dealers, we 
could not offer higher discount rates. 
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We used a similar order form for credit purchases, on which participants 
indicated how much of each input they would buy if credit were available. In the 
proposed credit scheme, the participants were allowed to pay the balance—that is, 
the total payment with interest, minus the initial payment—at the end of the 
subsequent season after the harvest, as long as the initial payment exceeded the 
minimum down-payment agreed upon at the meeting. The interest rate and the 
minimum down-payment rate were randomly assigned at the village level, 
according to the project. The interest rates offered were 5, 10, or 15 percent per 
cropping season. The minimum down payments offered were 20, 30, or 40 
percent. 
After the participants filled out the forms, one of them—typically a village 
leader—drew a ball from a bingo cage to randomly determine the discount rate; a 
second ball was then drawn, to determine whether the credit option was actually 
available to the group. The chance of winning the credit option was one in 10.
17
  
Finally, at the end of the sales experiment, the participants did, in fact, purchase 
inputs as indicated on the order forms at the discount level, and with or without 
the credit option as determined by the bingo game. 
Using the price contingent order form at the sales meeting, we obtained 
information on the participants’ p rchase q antit  levels at three different 
 
17
 The participants in all the 69 villages where the sales experiment was held had a chance to buy inputs on credit. 
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discount rates, with and without the credit option—that is, six quantity levels in 
total, for each input from each participant.  
C. Survey data 
In addition to the experimental intervention, we conducted a survey (called 
“RePEA     9,” hereafter) in  ctober–December of 2009 and collected 
information from the target households. In particular, we collected detailed 
information on maize production in the years 2008 and 2009, including that on 
input use on the experimental plots and other plots. In addition, we gathered 
information on social networks from neighbor households, by using a preprinted 
list of the names of the treatment households in the same village, together with the 
questionnaire, which asked the neighbor households about their relationship with 
each of the treatment households.
18
  For this study, we used both the data from the 
experimental intervention and the survey data conducted later. Table 2 shows the 
number of sample villages and households for each event, by region and type of 
household. 
[ Insert Table 2 Here ] 
 
18
 This is useful information in learning about social networks, not only for the neighbor households but also for the 
other types of households. However, we were able to collect information only from the neighbor households, given time 
and budget constraints regarding the field survey, as data collection had been time-consuming. 
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D. Village and household characteristics in 2009  
Table 3 shows the characteristics of villages involved in the RePEAT 2009 
survey, by village type. Owing to the nature of the random assignment of free-
input distribution, there were presumably no systematic differences in terms of 
pre-intervention characteristics, between these types of villages. The test statistics 
of the difference in mean of the key variables shown in Column 4 confirmed this 
presumption. Similarly, Table 3 shows household characteristics, by household 
type. As expected, there were no systematic differences between the treatment 
and control households except the past use of chemical fertilizers on maize plots. 
(The test statistics of the mean difference are given in Column 4.) The past use of 
chemical fertilizers was higher for the control households than the treatment 
households. If it had a positive effect on the adoption of modern inputs, we would 
underestimate the treatment effect of our intervention without controlling for this 
variable. We may need careful investigation on this.  
Our sample households comprised small-scale farmers; on average, each 
cultivated 1.2 ha of land, contained slightly fewer than eight family members, and 
had a head who was 50 years old and had six years of schooling. 
[ Insert Table 3 Here ] 
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Compared to the treatment and control households, the neighbor households 
were smaller in family size and in the land size cultivated; their heads were both 
younger and more educated. These differences between neighbor households and 
others, despite the sampling scheme (see the explanation of the sales experiment 
in the previous section), are probably because the treatment and control 
households were already older than the average residents were, because the 
original RePEAT samples had been sampled since 2003. At the same time, it may 
imply that they are different in their potential demand for intensive farming 
methods, owing to differences in land availability and education level. We 
controlled for these factors in regressions, to mitigate potential sampling biases 
between neighbor households and other types of households. 
E. Sample Attritions 
In the following analyses, we mainly use the information obtained from the 
sales experiment in 2009 and combined with RePEAT 2009 Survey data. There is 
an issue to be considered. The sample attritions in the sales experiment are not 
negligible, which are indicated in the parentheses in Table 2. When we held the 
sales experiment, we announced village leaders (who were supposed not to be the 
subject households) about our visit and its purpose two to three weeks prior to the 
scheduled date via mobile phone and asked them to circulate the information to 
the target households. Then, we also asked the leaders to mention to the target 
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households about the compensation for the participation. However, some of the 
target sample households did not show up at the sales experiment because some 
might not have been interested in the experiment or other may not have been 
correctly informed about the purpose and venue of the sales experiment. As a 
consequence, the sample attrition in the sales experiment was large and may cause 
a serious selection bias when we estimate the demand curves in the following 
analyses. Especially, if those who were not interested in the modern inputs did not 
participate in the event, the estimates of the demand for the modern inputs based 
only on the participants' information would be upwardly biased.  
One simple compromise may be to consider those absentees as those who 
would not purchase any input even when they had participated in and to 
incorporate them into the samples for the estimation of the demand. In that case, 
the purchase quantity of the absentees is set at zero and hence the estimates of the 
demand can be considered as the lower bound. We confirmed that the inclusion of 
the absentees by setting their purchase quantity at zero did not affect results much 
compared with the ones presented in the tables for the following analyses.
19
  
 
19
 Those results will be presented by the author upon request. 
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III. Empirical Strategies 
A. Demand for inputs, by household type 
The simplest approach to observing the impact of free-input distribution on 
adoption behavior on modern inputs in the subsequent season is to compare the 
mean values of the purchase quantities at the sales experiment among the different 
household types. For convenience, let us denote  as the purchase quantity of the 
i-th household. Let , , and  be the sets of households that belong to the 
treatment, control, and neighbor household groups, respectively. Since the 
assignment of the treatment status was random, the average effect of the free-
input distribution on the purchase quantity is given simply by 
. Also, its effect on the purchase quantity of the 
neighbor households is given as .  
Since we collected purchase-quantity data with and without the credit option, 
we were also able to determine the effect of the credit option on the purchase 
quantity by household type, i.e.,  –  for 
O  , where CR is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the credit 
option is available, and 0 otherwise. 
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B. Regressions 
In addition to the average intervention effect, depending on the ho sehold’s 
treatment status, we were also interested in the influence of other factors; which 
we examined by using simple regression models. This might also be important in 
estimating the impact of the intervention—especiall  on the neighbors’ adoption, 
given the difference in some characteristics of the neighbor households, compared 
to other household types.  
First, we considered a model that identified the factors that affect the purchase 
quantity of input x of household i located in community j at price level P, as well 
as the availability of the credit option, denoted by the dummy variable CR:  
(1)   
 , 
 
where T is a dummy variable for the treatment households, N is a dummy variable 
for the neighbor households, and X is a vector of other exogenous variables 
associated with the household and the community. The following variables are 
considered the exogenous X: the down-payment rate that determined the level of 
minimum payment for the credit sales, the interest rate charged for the credit sales, 
and their interactions with the credit-sales dummy; the household variables 
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involving the number of family members; the dependency rate (i.e., the ratio of 
family members aged below 15 or over 65 to those aged between 15 and 65 
inclusively); a dummy variable for female-headed households; the household 
head’s age and  ears of schooling; the size of land owned in ha; assets-holding 
level, in millions of Ush; past use of maize hybrid seed; and past use of chemical 
fertilizers on maize production.  
C. Heterogeneity in yield and profitability across regions and individuals 
The performance of modern inputs used in the trial plots of the treatment 
households varied across communities, as well as across households within a 
given community. According to the simple learning model, it is expected that 
successful experiences from the use of a new technology will enhance the 
likelihood of its use in subsequent periods, while unsuccessful experiences will 
red ce it  In addition to learning from one’s own experiences, the model also 
predicts learning from peers—especially among those who share information 
(Conley and Udry (2010)). Using survey data collected after the sales experiment, 
we examined the effect of the difference in performance of the trial plots on 
adoption in the subsequent season. 
Figure 3 shows the distribution of the yield difference between the actual yield 
of the trial plot and the hypothetical yield predicted by the farmers themselves 
among the treatment households, had the traditional method been applied to the 
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same plot.
20
 The two vertical lines indicate the level of yield gain from the use of 
modern inputs that would be required to recover the input costs for the trial plot 
(approximately US$25) at two different prices of the output. The dotted line 
corresponds to the required level at the output price of 500 Ush which is 
equivalent to the median producer price in 2008/2009, while the dashed line 
corresponds to the level at 250 Ush equivalent to the 5th percentile level.
21
  Yield 
gains varied across individuals, and not all the farmers saw positive profit-gains 
from the use of modern inputs. One of the reasons would be the fact that the 
modern inputs that we distributed for free had not been tailored to specific regions 
or individuals: they may not be suitable for certain soil or climate conditions. Also, 
differences in yield gain could be caused by differences in crop management, as 
some individuals might have managed them properly, while others did not. 
[ Insert Figure 3 Here] 
 
20
 There are 203 households which reported both the hypothetical yield and the actual yield of a plot where local seeds 
and no fertilizers were applied in the first cropping season in 2009. Comparing the hypothetical yield with the actual yield, 
their distributions appeared to be similar; the p-value of the t-test for the difference in mean is 0.895, which cannot reject 
the null hypothesis that the difference is equal to zero. 
21
 Typically, almost no purchased inputs are applied when local seed is planted. 
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D. Learning from one’s own experience: effect among treatment households  
Given the large heterogeneity in performance of the modern inputs on the trial 
plots, we were able to see its effect on the purchase of the modern inputs during 
the sales meeting among the treatment households. We incorporated the yield gain 
from the modern input use denoted,  where  represents the 
actual yield from the trial plot (the subscript i corresponds to household i and the 
superscript H indicates the use of hybrid seed and chemical fertilizers); , 
meanwhile, is the hypothetical yield reported by household i, had a local seed 
variety and no fertilizers been applied in the same plot. We used this variable as a 
covariate in the regression of the purchase of modern inputs. In this analysis, we 
focused on within-community variations in yield gain as a determinant of the 
purchase quantities, by controlling for household-level characteristics X and 
community-level specific factors by the community fixed effect . 
(2)  . 
 
The coefficient β captures the magnitude of the impact of the yield gain (in kg) of 
the trial plot from the use of modern inputs on the purchase quantity (in kg). We 
estimated the parameters of this model by applying a community-level fixed-
effect regression. 
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E. Learning from peers: effect among neighbor households 
Through social networking, the performance of the trial plots would affect 
adoption behavior, not only to treatment households themselves but also to their 
neighbor households. As Conley and Udry (2010) suggest, the flow of useful 
information may not necessarily be restricted to neighbors in close geographic 
proximity. Rather, social networks based on friendship or kinship may play 
critical roles in diffusing information. In this study, we look to distinguish the 
influence of geographic versus information peers.  
In the survey following the sales experiment, we collected from neighbor 
households data indicating their relationship with each of the treatment 
households. Particularly, we used information pertaining to whether or not they 
exchanged information on the farming business with each of the treatment 
households; we did so, to construct a measure that represents the effect of the 
performance of treatment peers’ experimental plots on the decision-making of 
neighbor households. We created a variable representing the average of the yield 
gain ΔY of the treatment households with which the i-th neighbor household 
exchanged information on the farming business, denoted by  and referred 
to as “mean  ield gain of information peers” in the res lts table ( able 7)  For the 
purpose of comparison, we also constructed the mean yield gain of geographic 
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peers, , which is defined as the weighted average of ΔY of geographic 
peers.
22
  
(3) , (n = info or 
geo) 
 
The coefficient β captures the magnitude of the impact of the mean yield gain of 
peers (in kg) on the purchase quantity (in kg) of the neighbor households. We 
estimated the parameters of this model by applying a community-level fixed-
effect regression. 
 
IV. Results 
A. Average purchase quantity by household type 
Table 4 shows the results of the average quantity purchased of each input at 
different discount rates, by household type.
23
 Panel A corresponds to the results 
 
22
 As the weight, we use the Gaussian kernel, ,  based on the distance in km between the households. 
Thus, the mean yield gain of geographic peers for the i-th neighbor household is given by  
 where h is a bandwidth. We use h=1. 
23
 Their graphical representations are give in Figure 4-1 to 4-3, by input type. 
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for cash purchases, and Panel B corresponds to those for credit purchases. 
Column 4 in Table 4 reports the difference in mean of purchased quantities 
between the control and treatment households and the standard errors of the test 
statistics (in parentheses) corresponding to the null hypothesis, in which the 
difference in mean is equal to 0. Similarly, Column 5 and 6 show the difference 
between the control and neighbor households and the difference between the 
treatment and control households, respectively. 
[ Insert Table 4 Here]  
[ Insert Figure 4-1 Here] 
[ Insert Figure 4-2 Here] 
[ Insert Figure 4-3 Here] 
The difference in purchased quantities between the control and treatment 
households was statistically significant at the 1 percent level for all inputs and at 
all discount levels. This observation confirmed the significant impact of free-input 
distribution on the adoption and purchased quantity of modern inputs in the 
subsequent cropping season, following free-input distribution. The difference 
becomes larger with the availability of credit. 
The purchased quantity of modern inputs by neighbor households was larger 
than that of control households, in all cases. The difference was statistically 
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significant for chemical fertilizers at all discount levels, but it was not significant 
for hybrid seed, as shown in Table 4. The level of purchased quantities lay 
between that of control and treatment households, in all cases.  
Panel C reports the differences in purchase quantities between the cash and 
credit purchase. The effect of credit was very large for all types of households, 
especially with regard to fertilizer purchases. The credit option boosted the 
purchased quantities of fertilizers more than threefold. The impact of credit was 
largest among treatment households, possibly because they had acquired, through 
the intervention, knowledge on the usage and profitability of modern inputs.  
B. Regression results 
We considered the four dependent variables for the regressions specified in the 
previous section. The first three variables were simply the weight of each of the 
three modern inputs—hybrid seed, base fertilizer, and top-dressing fertilizer, in 
kilograms—purchased at the sales experiment; the last variable, meanwhile, was 
the aggregate quantity index, which is defined as the total cost of those three 
inputs at the market price, divided by 1,000. 
Table 5 shows the results of the regressions, in which all household types were 
used as the sample, corresponding to Eq.(1). The estimates of the coefficients of 
the dummy for the treatment households, the neighbor households, and their 
interactions with the dummy for the credit option further supported the results of 
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Table 4. The purchase quantity of all the inputs was largest for the treatment 
households, and smallest for the control households (reference group); in the 
middle were the neighbor households, although the difference between the 
neighbor and control households was not significant. The credit option has the 
largest impact on all types of inputs. We also confirmed that the credit option had 
a differential impact, depending on the household type: it was largest for the 
treatment households (which can be seen as the coefficient of the interaction term 
of the credit-option dummy with the dummy for the treatment households) and 
smallest for the control households. These estimates were consistent with the 
results in Table 4, in which only the mean effect of the treatment status was 
considered and the other factors ignored; this implies that our randomization had 
been successfully implemented. 
[ Insert Table 5 Here ] 
The minimum down-payment rate—which determines the amount of cash 
payment required to be paid during the sales experiment for a credit purchase, and 
is randomly assigned at the community level—had a negative impact on the 
purchase quantity, but only for credit purchases. This result was consistent with 
the fact that the down payment rate was effective only for credit sales. Also, the 
significant effect implied that the immediate cash constraint was binding for the 
average participant in the sales experiment. A 10 percentage-point increase in the 
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minimum down-payment rate would result in a 6,374 Ush decrease in the total 
input purchase. 
The interest rate—charged for the cost of credit purchases and randomly 
assigned at the community level—was also effective for credit purchases only. 
Although we expected it to have a negative impact on the input purchase only for 
credit purchases, we obtained a somewhat odd result: the coefficient of the 
interest rate was positive and significant for the cash purchase of hybrid seed. 
This finding may require further investigation. 
Household size had a positive and significant effect on the purchase quantities 
of seed and base fertilizer, and on the quantity index. This may suggest that labor 
requirements for intensive farming methods that use modern inputs are higher 
than those for traditional farming   he coefficients of the ho sehold head’s age 
were negative and significant, meaning that younger farmers were more active in 
the  se of new inp ts than older ones   he head’s  ears of schooling had a 
positive effect on the purchase of modern inputs, indicating that more educated 
persons were more willing to buy modern inputs, although the magnitude was 
relatively small. The coefficients of size of land owned showed inconsistent signs, 
depending on the type of inputs. The coefficients of level of asset holdings were 
negative for all inputs, although their magnitude, too, was very small. 
The coefficients of past use of hybrid seed and chemical fertilizers were 
positive for all and significant, except for the purchase quantity of hybrid seed. 
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Although only a few farmers used maize hybrid seed and chemical fertilizers on 
maize prior to our experimental intervention (as shown in Table 1), it seems that 
they had known of the value of modern inputs and hence purchased more at the 
sales experiment. 
C. Learning from own experience 
We focused on the effect, among the treatment households, of the differential 
performance of the experimental plots that used modern inputs on purchase 
quantities in the subsequent season. Table 6 shows the results of regressions 
corresponding to Eq.(2), which helped determine the effects of the performance of 
the experimental plots among treatment households. 
Yield gains in the experimental plots, which were measured as the difference 
between the act al  ield of the experiment plot and the farmer’s prediction of the 
yield with the use of traditional inputs in the same plot, were found to 
significantly increase the purchase of inputs during the sales experiment. For 
example, on average, a 100-kg gain—the approximately median gain—increased 
the purchase of inputs by 4,510 Ush at the market price during the sales 
experiment (Table 6, regression 4). For other covariates, the results were more or 
less similar to the previous regressions in Table 5.  
[ Insert Table 6 Here ] 
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D. Learning from peers 
We estimated the impact of the yield gain of the treatment households on the 
neighbor ho seholds’ inp t p rchases  We  sed two variables defined in the 
previous section: the mean yield gain of information peers and the mean yield 
gain of geographic peers, in their respective experimental plots. The results are 
provided in Table 7. The coefficients of the mean yield gain of the information 
peers were all positive and significant, except for that of the top-dressing 
fertilizer; those of geographic peers showed different signs, depending on the 
types of input measures, and they were not significant for any of the inputs. This 
observation suggests that information on the usefulness or profitability of 
technology, or modern inputs, flows through an information network more 
efficiently than among neighbors with geographic proximity, and hence boosts the 
adoption of such technology. 
[ Insert Table 7 Here ] 
IV. Conclusions 
Maize productivity in Uganda remains very low; one obvious reason for this is 
the limited use of modern maize inputs. In the early stages of technology 
dissemination, a lack of knowledge is a crucial explanation for the low adoption 
rate of profitable technologies. Our study results showed that once farmers 
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recognize the benefits of new inputs in crop production, many of them will invest 
in the inputs for the subsequent season. It is also important to note that farmers 
learn from their own and others’ s ccessful experiences, through social 
networking. These observations point to the importance of agricultural extension 
services in diffusing new and profitable technologies. Emphasizing the role of 
extension services, it is obviously important to note that because the profitability 
of a technology can vary to a great extent across regions and with time, an 
untailored technology will not bestow benefits upon every farmer in every place. 
Technologies may need to be chosen by those with on-the-ground knowledge of 
suitable technologies and their profitability. For this reason, it might often be the 
case that local private stakeholders such as input suppliers who can both deal with 
tailored agricultural-input technologies and have knowledge of the commodity 
market might well be more competent providers of extension services than public 
providers. We believe that there is ample opportunity for the private sector to play 
a significant role in this service area. 
Finally, this study also showed that Ugandan farmers face severe credit 
constraints; this was underscored by the fact that their demand for inputs 
increased significantly when they were given a credit option. This observation 
suggests that the provision of affordable financial services in rural areas could 
prompt Ugandan farmers to change their farming methods, boost productivity, 
and improve their quality of life. Owing to the development of mobile 
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technologies and drastic reductions in the transaction costs associated with 
communication and financial services via mobile phones, financial services that 
target small-scale farmers in remote areas can become more feasible, at least on a 
technical level. The provision of such services promises the potential of great 
advances among the farmers in Uganda. 
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FIGURE 1. TIMELINE OF SURVEYS AND FIELD EXPERIMENTS 
 
 
FIGURE 2. SURVEY VILLAGES 
Notes: Black circles indicate treatment villages; white circles indicate control villages. 
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FIGURE 3. DIFFERENCE (IN KG) BETWEEN THE HYBRID YIELD (ACTUAL) IN THE EXPERIMENTAL PLOT (0.1 HA) AND THE LOCAL 
YIELD (PREDICTED), AMONG THE TREATMENT HOUSEHOLDS 
Notes: two vertical reference lines—the dotted line on the left and the dashed line on the right—correspond to the yield 
levels at which the farmer recovers the cost used in the experimental plot at different output price levels, 500 Ush/kg 
(equivalent to the median level of the producer price in 2008/2009) and 250 Ush/kg (equivalent to the 5th percentile level), 
respectively. Most farmers who planted local seed applied no purchased inputs. 
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FIGURE 4-1. HYBRID SEED: ESTIMATED DEMAND CURVES 
Note: The arrows indicate 95 percent confidence intervals. 
Cash Sales 
Credit Sales 
95% c.i. 
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FIGURE 4-2. BASE FERTILIZER: ESTIMATED DEMAND CURVES 
Note: The arrows indicate 95 percent confidence intervals. 
Cash Sales 
Credit Sales 
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FIGURE 4-3. TOP-DRESSING FERTILIZER: ESTIMATED DEMAND CURVES 
Note: The arrows indicate 95 percent confidence intervals. 
 
Cash Sales 
Credit Sales 
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TABLE 1. COMPARISON OF INPUT USE IN MAIZE PRODUCTION, BETWEEN KENYA AND UGANDA 
 Kenya 
2004/2007 
(1) 
Uganda 
2003/2005 
(2) 
 
Hybrid seed use (percent) 
 
59.0 
 
4.9 a 
 (49.2) (21.6) 
Average inorganic fertilizer application (kg/ha) 94.7 2.4 
 (124.5) (18.9) 
Average organic fertilizer application (kg/ha) 1,935 86 
 (4,835) (768) 
Notes: Standard deviations are given in parentheses. The difference in mean for each of the three variables 
above is significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level.  
Sources: RePEAT 2004/2007 in Kenya, RePEAT 2003/2005 in Uganda. 
a Because there is no information on the type details of maize seed in the questionnaire used in the Uganda 
surveys, the percentage of hybrid seed use was obtained as the proportion of maize plots with seed whose price 
was more than or equal to 3,000 Ush/kg. 
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TABLE 2. NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS PARTICIPATING IN EACH EVENT IN EASTERN AND CENTRAL REGIONS 
Panel A  Village type by status of free input distribution, 2009 
Number of villages, by type Total Control Treatment  
   (1) (2) (3)  
 Eastern  39 13 26  
 Central  30 10 20  
       
  
Panel B Household type by status of free input distribution, 2009 
Number of households, by event and type Total Control Treatment Neighbor 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Free input distribution, Feb.–Mar. 2009     
 Eastern  242 0 242  
   (8)  (8)  
 Central  135 0 135  
   (37)  (37)  
Sales experiment, Aug.–Sept. 2009     
 Eastern  512 109 210 193 
   (93) (13) (40) (43) 
 Central  297 78 124 95 
   (112) (17) (48) (47) 
RePEAT 2009 Survey, Oct.–Dec. 2009     
 Eastern  575 118 235 222 
   (33) (4) (15) (14) 
 Central  372 90 155 127 
   (37) (5) (17) (15) 
Note: The size of sample attrition (those targeted minus those who participated) is shown in parentheses. For the 
free-input distribution, the sales experiment, and the RePEAT 2009 survey, we did not target the households 
who were migrated out of LC1 (the smallest administrative unit in Uganda) after the RePEAT 2005 survey. 
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TABLE 3. SUMMARY STATISTICS OF KEY VARIABLES IN THE REPEAT 2009 SURVEY 
Panel A. Mean by village type Mean difference 
Village Characteristics Control Treatment  Control vs. 
Treatment 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Longitude (degree) 33.03 32.97  0.06   
 (0.98) (1.06)  (0.26)   
Latitude (degree) 0.6 0.59  0.01   
 (0.45) (0.63)  (0.14)   
Altitude (meter) 1,251.1 1,204.7  46.39   
 (181.8) (140.4)  (43.20)   
1{Public electricity is 
available} 
0.32 0.14  0.18   
 (0.48) (0.35)  (0.11)   
1{Mobile network is available} 1 1  0   
 (0.00) (0.00)  (.)   
1{Any primary school} 0.68 0.61  0.07   
 (0.48) (0.49)  (0.13)   
1{Any secondary school} 0.09 0.11  –0.02   
 (0.29) (0.32)  (0.08)   
1{Any health facility} 0.82 0.8  0.02   
 (0.39) (0.41)  (0.10)   
       
Panel B. Mean by household type Mean difference 
Household Characteristics Control Treatment Neighbor Control vs. 
Treatment 
Control vs. 
Neighbor 
Treatment 
vs. Neighbor 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1{used maize HYV seed in 
past} 0.15 0.15 0.12 -0.001 0.03 0.03 
 (0.36) (0.36) (0.34) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
1{used chem. fertilizers on 
maize in past} 0.16 0.10 0.12 -0.07*** 0.05 -0.02 
 (0.37) (0.30) (0.33) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Household size 7.75 7.97 7.12 –0.22 0.63*** 0.85**** 
 (3.45) (3.82) (3.31) (0.31) (0.30) (0.26) 
1{head is female} 0.18 0.13 0.11 0.05 0.07*** 0.02 
 (0.38) (0.34) (0.32) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Head’s Age 50.4 49.7 43.4 0.76 7.01**** 6.25**** 
 (14.2) (13.1) (13.7) (1.20) (1.24) (1.0) 
Head’s  ears of schooling 5.68 6.05 6.60 –0.37 –0.91*** –0.54* 
 (4.03) (4.19) (4.30) (0.35) (0.36) (0.31) 
Cultivated land (ha) a 1.21 1.18 1.03 0.03 0.18*** 0.16*** 
 (0.93) (0.95) (0.96) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) 
Assets (millions of Ush) 0.64 1.08 0.50 –0.44 0.15 0.58* 
 (2.0) (5.79) (0.98) (0.33) (0.15) (0.30) 
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Assets except vehicle (millions 
of Ush) 0.45 0.55 0.45 –0.10 0.00 0.10* 
 (0.66) (0.80) (0.68) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
1{owns mobile phone} 0.51 0.56 0.55 –0.06 –0.04 0.01 
 (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Note: Standard deviations are given in parenthese in Column (1)-(3). Standard errors are given in parentheses in 
Column (4)-(6).  
a Amount of land cultivated (ha) in main cropping season. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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TABLE 4. PURCHASE QUANTITY OF MODERN INPUTS AT THE SALES EXPERIMENT 
Panel A. Mean by household type Mean difference 
Cash purchase Control Treatment Neighbor Control vs. 
Treatment 
Control vs. 
Neighbor 
Treatment vs. 
Neighbor 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Hybrid seed (kg) 
Discount rate       
0 percent 0.95 1.75 1.12 -0.79*** -0.16 0.63*** 
 (1.51) (2.48) (1.58) (0.16) (0.14) (0.15) 
10 percent 1.00 1.85 1.20 -0.86*** -0.2 0.65*** 
 (1.58) (2.64) (1.72) (0.17) (0.15) (0.16) 
20 percent 1.07 2.01 1.30 -0.94*** -0.24 0.71*** 
 (1.67) (2.90) (1.88) (0.19) (0.16) (0.18) 
Base fertilizer (kg) 
0 percent 0.59 1.96 0.89 –1.37*** –0.3* 1.07*** 
 (1.76) (4.73) (2.18) (0.27) (0.17) (0.27) 
10 percent 0.70 2.14 1.00 –1.44*** –0.3 1.14*** 
 (2.04) (4.93) (2.40) (0.29) (0.19) (0.28) 
20 percent 0.80 2.37 1.22 –1.57*** –0.42* 1.15*** 
 (2.21) (5.29) (3.03) (0.31) (0.23) (0.32) 
Top-dressing fertilizer 
0 percent 0.14 0.92 0.49 –0.78*** –0.35*** 0.43*** 
 (0.58) (2.74) (1.53) (0.15) (0.09) (0.16) 
10 percent 0.15 1.02 0.52 –0.86*** –0.36*** 0.5*** 
 (0.61) (2.98) (1.57) (0.16) (0.10) (0.17) 
20 percent 0.19 1.15 0.58 –0.96*** –0.39*** 0.57*** 
 (0.69) (3.27) (1.72) (0.17) (0.11) (0.19) 
       
Panel B. Mean by household type Mean difference 
Credit purchase Control Treatment Neighbor Control vs. 
Treatment 
Control vs. 
Neighbor 
Treatment vs. 
Neighbor 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Hybrid seed (kg) 
Discount rate       
0 percent 1.61 2.75 1.95 –1.14*** –0.34 0.79*** 
 (2.65) (3.61) (2.84) (0.26) (0.24) (0.24) 
10 percent 1.66 2.84 2.00 –1.18*** –0.34 0.84*** 
 (2.75) (3.81) (2.87) (0.27) (0.25) (0.25) 
20 percent 1.74 2.99 2.05 –1.25*** –0.31 0.93*** 
 (2.85) (4.08) (2.94) (0.29) (0.26) (0.26) 
Base fertilizer (kg) 
0 percent 2.68 6.23 3.86 –3.55*** –1.18** 2.37*** 
 (6.07) (10.71) (6.86) (0.69) (0.57) (0.66) 
10 percent 2.99 6.73 4.23 –3.74*** –1.24** 2.5*** 
 (6.67) (11.21) (7.05) (0.73) (0.60) (0.69) 
20 percent 3.25 7.14 4.43 –3.88*** –1.17* 2.71*** 
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 (7.14) (11.70) (7.31) (0.77) (0.64) (0.71) 
Top-dressing fertilizer 
0 percent 1.03 3.67 2.27 –2.63** –1.24** 1.39** 
 (3.17) (7.02) (4.75) (0.42) (0.34) (0.44) 
10 percent 1.22 3.93 2.46 –2.72** –1.24** 1.48** 
 (3.40) (7.34) (4.99) (0.44) (0.36) (0.46) 
20 percent 1.41 4.28 2.61 –2.88** –1.21** 1.67** 
 (3.72) (7.77) (5.13) (0.47) (0.38) (0.48) 
Note: Standard deviations are given in parenthese in Column (1)-(3). Standard errors are given in parentheses in 
Column (4)-(6).  
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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TABLE 4 (CONTINUED). PURCHASE QUANTITY OF MODERN INPUTS AT THE SALES EXPERIMENT 
Panel C. Mean by household type Mean difference 
Difference 
between cash 
and credit 
purchase 
Control Treatment Neighbor Control vs. 
Treatment 
Control vs. 
Neighbor 
Treatment 
vs. 
Neighbor 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Hybrid seed (kg) 
Discount rate       
0 percent 0.66*** 1.00*** 0.84*** –0.34** –0.18 0.16 
 (0.11) (0.09) (0.10) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) 
10 percent 0.66*** 0.99*** 0.8*** –0.33** –0.14 0.19 
 (0.11) (0.10) (0.09) (0.15) (0.15) (0.13) 
20 percent 0.67*** 0.99*** 0.77*** –0.32** –0.10 0.22 
 (0.12) (0.10) (0.09) (0.16) (0.15) (0.14) 
Base fertilizer (kg) 
0 percent 2.09*** 4.27*** 2.98*** –2.18*** –0.88* 1.29** 
 (0.35) (0.40) (0.32) (0.54) (0.48) (0.52) 
10 percent 2.29*** 4.59*** 3.23*** –2.31*** –0.95* 1.36*** 
 (0.39) (0.42) (0.32) (0.57) (0.50) (0.53) 
20 percent 2.45*** 4.83*** 3.28*** –2.38*** –0.82 1.55*** 
 (0.41) (0.43) (0.31) (0.60) (0.52) (0.54) 
Top-dressing fertilizer (kg) 
0 percent 0.89*** 2.75*** 1.78*** –1.85*** –0.89*** 0.96*** 
 (0.21) (0.29) (0.22) (0.36) (0.30) (0.37) 
10 percent 1.07*** 2.92*** 1.94*** –1.85*** –0.88*** 0.98** 
 (0.22) (0.30) (0.23) (0.38) (0.32) (0.38) 
20 percent 1.22*** 3.2*** 2.06*** –1.98*** –0.84** 1.14*** 
 (0.24) (0.32) (0.24) (0.40) (0.34) (0.40) 
Note: Standard errors for the t-test (H0: the mean value of the difference between credit purchase and cash 
purchase is equal to 0) are given in parentheses in Column (1)-(3). Standard errors are given in parentheses in 
Column (4)-(6).  
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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TABLE 5. DETERMINANTS OF INPUT PURCHASE: OLS REGRESSION 
  Dependent variables 
 
Control variables 
Hybrid seed 
(kg) 
Base 
fertilizer (kg) 
Top-dressing 
fertilizer (kg) 
Aggregate 
quantity index 
(1,000 Ush) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
1{Treatment HH} 1.851*** 3.339*** 2.459*** 16.71*** 
 (0.688) (1.112) (0.619) (4.773) 
1{Neighbor HH} 0.227 0.702 0.538 2.522 
 (0.506) (0.890) (0.410) (3.517) 
Price -0.785*** -2.380*** -1.176*** -10.29*** 
 (0.219) (0.555) (0.287) (2.095) 
Price * 1{Treatment HH} -0.848** -1.829** -1.524*** -8.458** 
 (0.417) (0.870) (0.568) (3.239) 
Price * 1{Neighbor HH} -0.104 -0.497 -0.067 -0.828 
 (0.264) (0.710) (0.362) (2.414) 
1{Credit sales} 1.250*** 9.505*** 4.164** 30.65*** 
 (0.426) (2.934) (1.698) (8.627) 
1{Treatment HH} * 1{Credit sales} 0.414 2.880*** 2.244*** 10.85*** 
 (0.338) (1.030) (0.684) (3.591) 
1{Neighbor HH} * 1{Credit sales} 0.137 0.829 0.933* 3.647 
 (0.326) (0.830) (0.512) (2.951) 
Down-payment rate -0.341 -1.208 -1.328 -5.95 
 (1.641) (2.676) (1.957) (10.85) 
Down-payment rate * 1{Credit sales} -2.330* -20.34** -8.088** -63.74*** 
 (1.265) (7.976) (3.734) (22.13) 
Interest rate 3.287 -2.517 -2.619 3.949 
 (3.213) (6.833) (5.348) (26.34) 
Interest rate * 1{Credit sales} 2.051 -8.693 -4.532 -15.08 
 (3.229) (11.94) (8.769) (40.81) 
Household size 0.095* 0.160* 0.0685 0.800** 
 (0.054) (0.082) (0.045) (0.344) 
Dependency rate -0.100 -0.344** -0.105 -1.226* 
 (0.093) (0.150) (0.107) (0.629) 
1{Female headed HH} -0.321 -0.501 -0.691** -3.250* 
 (0.215) (0.493) (0.288) (1.851) 
Head’s age -0.017** -0.032* -0.004 -0.131* 
 (0.008) (0.018) (0.011) (0.071) 
Head’s  ears of schooling 0.036 0.133** 0.060 0.499** 
 (0.028) (0.062) (0.038) (0.219) 
Land size owned (ha) -0.004 -0.029*** 0.044** 0.005 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.022) (0.064) 
Asset holdings (millions of Ush) -0.014 -0.014 -0.029*** -0.122 
 (0.009) (0.018) (0.009) (0.073) 
1{past use of maize HYV seed} 0.612* 2.180** 1.269 8.178** 
 (0.316) (1.026) (0.826) (3.787) 
1{past use chem. fertilizers on maize} 0.489 1.509** 1.120** 6.712** 
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 (0.391) (0.720) (0.491) (2.960) 
Constant 1.537* 3.095* 0.936 13.83* 
 (0.870) (1.789) (1.418) (7.345) 
Number of observations 3,966 3,966 3,962 3,962 
Number of households 661 661 661 661 
Number of communities 68 68 68 68 
R-sq 0.101 0.166 0.151 0.187 
Note: Robust standard errors (clustered by community) are given in parentheses. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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TABLE 6. DETERMINANTS OF INPUT PURCHASE AMONG TREATMENT HOUSEHOLDS: COMMUNITY-FIXED EFFECT 
REGRESSION 
Dependent variables 
 
Control variables 
Hybrid seed 
(kg) 
Base 
fertilizer (kg) 
Top-dressing 
fertilizer (kg) 
Aggregate 
quantity index 
(1,000 Ush) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Yield gain of experimental plot (kg) 0.002 0.012** 0.008** 0.045** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.022) 
Price –1.433*** –4.664*** –2.640*** –18.82*** 
 (0.339) (0.745) (0.557) (2.689) 
1{Credit sales} 1.690*** 17.00*** 5.858* 50.38*** 
 (0.488) (5.161) (2.934) (12.98) 
Down-payment rate * 1{Credit sales} –1.71 –31.74** –4.609 –79.77** 
 (1.441) (15.27) (6.753) (35.11) 
Interest rate * 1{Credit sales} 0.223 –18.1 –7.91 –47.61 
 (3.981) (18.60) (15.85) (64.74) 
Household size 0.0987* 0.466*** 0.258*** 1.725*** 
 (0.058) (0.135) (0.095) (0.579) 
Dependency rate –0.034 0.0197 0.256 0.356 
 (0.207) (0.397) (0.213) (1.504) 
1{Female-headed HH} –0.193 –0.467 –0.784 –2.952 
 (0.370) (0.932) (0.824) (3.764) 
Head’s age –0.0007 –0.013 –0.014 –0.048 
 (0.012) (0.030) (0.025) (0.116) 
Head’s  ears of schooling 0.094 0.181 –0.115 0.526 
 (0.066) (0.153) (0.072) (0.479) 
Amount of land owned (ha) –0.004 –0.070*** 0.039** –0.091 
 (0.006) (0.013) (0.016) (0.059) 
Asset holdings (millions of Ush) 0.089*** 0.200*** 0.009 0.756*** 
 (0.026) (0.051) (0.025) (0.203) 
1{past use of maize Hybrid seed} 1.582** 1.585 0.59 9.812* 
 (0.773) (1.104) (1.020) (5.442) 
1{past use chem. fertilizers on maize} –0.362 0.231 0.331 –0.258 
 (0.446) (0.875) (0.667) (3.824) 
Constant 1.767* 0.267 1.146 8.364 
 (0.909) (2.589) (1.894) (8.985) 
Number of observations 1,500 1,500 1,499 1,499 
Number of communities 44 44 44 44 
R-sq 0.109 0.226 0.194 0.233 
Note: Robust standard errors (clustered by community) are given in parentheses. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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TABLE 7. DETERMINANTS OF INPUT PURCHASE AMONG NEIGHBOR HOUSEHOLDS: COMMUNITY-FIXED EFFECT 
REGRESSION  
  Dependent variables 
Control variables 
Hybrid seed 
(kg) 
Base fertilizer 
(kg) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Mean yield gain of information peers (kg) 0.0046**  0.0080**  
 (0.002)  (0.004)  
Mean yield gain of geographic peers (kg)  0.0053  –0.0090 
  (0.005)  (0.020) 
Price –0.880*** –0.880*** –2.903*** –2.903*** 
 (0.149) (0.149) (0.448) (0.448) 
1{Credit sales} 1.822*** 1.822*** 11.43*** 11.43*** 
 (0.441) (0.441) (2.673) (2.673) 
Down-payment rate * 1{Credit sales} –5.176*** –5.176*** –19.42*** –19.42*** 
 (1.429) (1.429) (5.499) (5.499) 
Interest rate * 1{Credit sales} 5.765* 5.765* –22.09* –22.09* 
 (3.329) (3.329) (12.22) (12.22) 
Household size 0.0415 0.0756 0.00335 0.0471 
 (0.046) (0.049) (0.093) (0.093) 
Dependency rate –0.222** –0.316*** –0.560** –0.674** 
 (0.096) (0.101) (0.273) (0.259) 
1{Female-headed HH} –0.136 0.136 –1.716** –1.247* 
 (0.515) (0.580) (0.709) (0.620) 
Head’s age –0.00385 –0.00797 –0.0224 –0.0259 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.034) (0.035) 
Head’s  ears of schooling 0.0671** 0.0725** 0.145* 0.158* 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.081) (0.082) 
Amount of land owned (ha) 0.0595 0.0823 0.145 0.153 
 (0.068) (0.071) (0.205) (0.227) 
Asset holdings (millions of Ush) 0.324** 0.299** 0.832* 0.847* 
 (0.150) (0.138) (0.413) (0.458) 
1{past use of maize Hybrid seed} –0.00694 0.0772 2.12 2.182 
 (0.393) (0.402) (1.283) (1.304) 
1{past use chem. fertilizers on maize} 0.915* 0.918* 0.754 0.828 
 (0.479) (0.510) (1.168) (1.207) 
Constant 0.859 0.856 2.555 4.631 
 (0.702) (1.073) (1.632) (2.858) 
Number of observations 1,332 1,332 1,332 1,332 
Number of communities 44 44 44 44 
R-sq 0.212 0.19 0.243 0.235 
Note: Robust standard errors (clustered by community) are given in parentheses. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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TABLE 7 (CONTINUED). DETERMINANTS OF INPUT PURCHASE AMONG NEIGHBOR HOUSEHOLDS: COMMUNITY-FIXED 
EFFECT REGRESSION  
  Dependent variables 
Control variables 
Top-dressing fertilizer  
(kg) 
Aggregated quantity index 
(1,000 Ush) 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Mean yield gain of information peers (kg) 0.0022  0.037**  
 (0.002)  (0.016)  
Mean yield gain of geographic peers (kg)  –0.011  –0.018 
  (0.012)  (0.067) 
Price –1.253*** –1.253*** –11.16*** –11.16*** 
 (0.220) (0.220) (1.173) (1.173) 
1{Credit sales} 7.514*** 7.514*** 41.61*** 41.61*** 
 (1.932) (1.932) (8.812) (8.812) 
Down-payment rate * 1{Credit sales} –15.28*** –15.28*** –82.91*** –82.91*** 
 (4.368) (4.368) (19.54) (19.54) 
Interest rate * 1{Credit sales} –8.046 –8.046 –33.03 –33.03 
 (7.962) (7.962) (39.09) (39.09) 
Household size 0.00893 0.0142 0.167 0.391 
 (0.065) (0.063) (0.297) (0.291) 
Dependency rate –0.325 –0.334 –2.416** –3.009*** 
 (0.199) (0.209) (1.003) (0.918) 
1{Female-headed HH} –0.63 –0.501 –4.998** –2.824 
 (0.496) (0.462) (2.304) (2.388) 
Head’s age –0.0080 –0.0073 –0.075 –0.096 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.122) (0.126) 
Head’s  ears of schooling 0.109* 0.114* 0.725** 0.782** 
 (0.058) (0.059) (0.337) (0.339) 
Amount of land owned (ha) 0.077 0.065 0.683 0.760 
 (0.150) (0.156) (0.790) (0.857) 
Asset holdings (millions of Ush) 0.453 0.484* 3.518*** 3.509** 
 (0.274) (0.281) (1.270) (1.409) 
1{past use of maize HYV seed} 0.503 0.483 4.892 5.29 
 (0.801) (0.807) (3.829) (3.935) 
1{past use chem. fertilizers on maize} 1.031 1.083 6.352 6.607 
 (0.838) (0.804) (4.316) (4.531) 
Constant 0.928 2.442 9.777 16.65 
 (1.001) (1.796) (6.327) (10.420) 
Number of observations 1,332 1,332 1,332 1,332 
Number of communities 44 44 44 44 
R-sq 0.197 0.199 0.297 0.282 
Note: Robust standard errors (clustered by community) are given in parentheses. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 59 
 
Appendix. Price-contingent order form used in the sales experiment 
Q1a. Do you know the purpose of us coming is to sell the agricultural inputs?     1. Yes      2. No  
Q1b. How many days ago did you know of this sales experiment being held today? 
Q2. In the case of cash sales, how many kilograms of inputs do you buy? Fill out the following 
table. 
Discount 
rate 
Hybrid seed Base fertilizer Top-dressing 
fertilizer 
(Coordinators help to calculate; 
round-down the last two digits) 
Total amount you would pay today 
 0 
percent 
(3,600) 
 
kg 
(2,100)  
 
kg 
(1,700)  
 
kg Ush 
10 
percent 
(3,240)  
 
kg 
(1,890)  
 
kg 
(1,530)  
 
kg Ush 
20 
percent 
(2,880)  
 
kg 
(1,680)  
 
kg 
(1,360)  
 
kg Ush 
Note: Discount prices per kg (Ush) are given in parentheses. 
 
Q3. In the case of credit sales, how many kilograms of inputs do you buy? Fill-out the following 
table.  
 Hybrid 
seed 
Base 
fertilizer 
Top-
dressing 
fertilizer 
(Coordinators help to calculate; 
round down the last two digits in Total amount) 
Discount 
rate 
  Sub-
total 
 
Down-
payment 
(above xx 
percent of 
Subtotal)* 
Balance 
(Subtotal 
minus Down-
payment) 
Interest 
(zz percent of 
Balance)* 
Total 
amount 
you pay 
after 
harvest 
 0 
percent 
(3,600) 
 
kg 
(2,100)  
 
kg 
(1,700)  
 
kg Ush Ush Ush Ush Ush 
10 
percent 
(3,240)  
 
kg 
(1,890)  
 
kg 
(1,530)  
 
kg Ush Ush Ush Ush Ush 
20 
percent 
(2,880)  
 
kg 
(1,680)  
 
kg 
(1,360)  
 
kg Ush Ush Ush Ush Ush 
* The numbers for xx and zz are preprinted and differ from village to village. 
 
Q4. If you decide to buy inputs, how do you finance the cost?  
1. Own savings  2. Borrowing from relatives  3. Borrowing from friends  4. Other 
(                           ) 
